
MISSION C295C
IMMEDIATE ACTION

25X1	TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/01/24 : CIA-RD	DP66B00597R000300020100-0	.¥°,
	Γ		
	MISSION C295C		
	17 MAY 1965		
		1	
			25X1 25X1
GROUP    Excluded from outomatic dewignating and declessification	TOP SECRET		
		NDCCD00507D00020000400.0	

	TOP SECRET
	CONTENTS
,	1. Mission track with "Go-No-Go" weather. Basic mission data and special equipment on reverse side of map.
	2. Signature blocks as appropriate. (On reverse side of map.)
	3. Map with known SAM's, MIG-21 bases plotted, and current fighter AOB.
	4. Vulnerability estimate for current mission.
	5. Authority for mission (COMOR/USIB/303 Committee).
	6. Cable to NPIC and reply SAM System search - Attachments 1 and 2).
	7. message and approval (Attachments 3 and 4).
	8. and pproval (Attachments 5 and 6).
	9. JRC coordination (Parts I and II - Mission Plan - Attachment 7).
	10. (Mission Intelligence Data - Attachment 8).
,	
¥	
- 1	TOP SECRET

## Approved For Release 2003/01/24 : CIA-RDP66B00597R000300020100-0



GO-NO-GO FCST ULD 18/00202-07002 Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP66B00597R000300020100-0 MSN C295C MAY 65

# MISSION PROPOSAL


NUMBER	C295C	
LAUNCH DATE/TIME	18/0020Z	
TOTAL DISTANCE	2462 N.M.	
TOTAL TIME/DENIED TERRITORY TIME	0645 0243	
PENETRATION ALTITUDE	69,000 FT.	
MAXIMUM ALTITUDE	-	25X1
FUEL RESERVE	180 GAL.	
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	Systems 6, 9B, 12B,	
	13, Delta II, Oscar	
	Sierra	

APPROVALS:

Cut of Bldg 1430 has 17 Way Carbally assert Community.

RICHARD HELMS
DDCI

WILLIAM F. RABORN, JR. DCI



C295C PRIORITY I 10301E 25X1 Dien Bien Phu Mil. Complex 2123N 10358E 2230N Lao Kay Complex 10355E 2120N Son La Mil. Complex 10442E 2103N Van Yen Mil. 10548E Phuc Yen New A/F 2113N 10646E Lang Son Complex 2151N 10642E Dong Dang Complex Port Wallut Port Fac. 2156N 10735E 2112N 10759E 2132N Mon Cay Complex 2052N 10641E Haiphong Port Complex 2049N 10644E Haiphong/Cat BI A/F PRIORITY II 2207N 10707E 25X1 Ning Ming A/F U/C 2208N 10704E Ning Ming Transshipment Pt. 10645E 2206N Ping Hsiang Complex 2205N 10645E Ping Hsiang O4dinance Depot PRIORITY 1B PRIORITY 1A COMOR NO. TARGET NAME COMOR NO. 25X1 Liu Chou Airfield 25X1 Hai Kou Airfield Lei Yang Airfield Ling Shui Airfield Meng Tzu Airfield, West Nan Hai/Kuang Chou Airfield (Fo Shan) Ning Ming Airfield U/C Tsam Kong Naval Base (Chan Chiang) Shan Tou Naval Base Huang Pu Naval Base Lung Men Suspect Submarine Base Sui Chi Airfield (Lei Pei) Ssu Mao Military Area Nan Ning Airfield, South Meng La Army Barracks, West
Fo Hai Army Barracks, South (Meng Hai)
Meng Tzu Army Barracks, South
ei Lin Army Barracks Kun Ming Airfield Yu Lin Naval Base Hai Kou Naval Base Ping Hsiang Complex heng Yang Ammo Depot, ENE Wen Shan Complex Kai Yuan - Hq. 13th Army Chin Pien Military Area (Lan Tsang) Kuei Hsien Army Barracks Kun Ming Complex

REMARKS

1300, 17 May 1965

# VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE FOR MISSION C295C

#### CONCLUSION:

There are no known surface-to-air missile defenses in South China or North Vietnam capable of interfering with Mission C295C. The risk of a successful U-2 intercept by a MIG-21 on this mission is less than 22%.

## GENERAL:

The MIG-15, 17, and 19 do not present a threat to the U-2 at or above 69,000 feet. Of these three fighter types. none can cruise supersonic. The MIG-19 can exceed Mach 1. perform a dynamic climb to approximately 62,000 feet and cruise subsonic, steady state at 59,000 plus or minus 1000 The MIG-19 does not have sufficient power to perform an effective ZOOM maneuver.

The MIG-21 has the capability of intercepting the U-2 at 69,000 feet by performing a ZOOM maneuver and launching an AA-2 Sidewinder type IR missile.

# AIR ORDER OF BATTLE FOR SOUTH CHINA:

There are fo	our airfields in South China pertinent to	
	They are Lingshui, Haikou, Nanning South, a	nd
	s have been noted in photography	
as having been a	t Nanning South, and Suichi.	_

Based on the latest photography estimate approximately seven MIG-21's to be based among the airfields mentioned earlier. Of this number we estimate four MIG-21's to be in operational status and within range of Mission C295C. If this assumption is correct, then the estimated risk of a successful MIG-21 intercept against the U-2 at 69,000 feet is less than 22%. This figure is correct, assuming whole intercept system, including GCI, is perfect throughout the intercept attempt. Red Chinese fighters have penetrated the DRV border on intercept attempts in the past, and we must assume they will continue to cross the border to intercept the U-2 in the future.

A request for a SAM search thirty nautical miles either side of planned track has been levied on NPIC. The results were negative and copies of the request and results may be found elsewhere in this report.

25X1

25X1

REQUIREMENT: STATED IN COMOR 25/142 OF FEB 1965.

APPROVED BY USIB 3 MARCH 1965.

REQUIREMENT FOR IMMEDIATE COVERAGE OF

28 TARGETS IN SOUTH CHINA AND SUBSEQUENTLY

OBTAIN WEEKLY COVERAGE OF A REPRESENTATIVE

ONE QUARTER OF THESE TARGETS. IN ADDITION,

USIB ON 12 MAY APPROVED URGENT COVERAGE OF

PING HSIANG AS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TARGET

IN SOUTH CHINA (COMOR D 25/164).

APPROVAL: 303 COMMITTEE APPROVED NRO FORECAST FOR MAY ON 30 APRIL.

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt